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Day 27
1946, 04
{1}

COL. AMEN : I would like to call as a witness for the Prosecution Walter Schellenberg.

[The witness, Schellenberg, took the stand.]
{2}

THE PRESIDENT: Is your name Walter Schellenberg?

{3}

WALTER SCHELLENBERG(Witness): My name is Walter Schellenberg.

{4}

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: "I swear by God- the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing."

[The witness repeated the oath.]
{5}

COL. AMEN : Speak slowly and pause between the questions and the answers.

Where were you born?

{6}

SCHELLENBERG: In Saarbrucken.

{7}

COL. AMEN : How old are you?

{8}

SCHELLENBERG: Thirty-five years.

{9}

COL. AMEN : You were a member of the NSDAP?

{10}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

{11}

COL. AMEN : And of the SS?

{12}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; the SS also.

{13}

COL. AMEN : And of the Waffen-SS?

{14}

SCHELLENBERG: And the Waffen-SS.

{15}

COL. AMEN : And the SD?

{16}

SCHELLENBERG: And the SD.

{17}

COL. AMEN : What was the highest office you held?

{18}

SCHELLENBERG: The highest rank I held was that of SS Brigadefuehrer in the SS, and of major general in the Waffen-SS.

{19}

COL. AMEN : You were Chief of Amt VI?

{20}

SCHELLENBERG: I was Chief of Amt VI and Military.

{21}

COL. AMEN : During what period of time?

374
{22}

SCHELLENBERG: I was made Deputy Chief of Amt VI in July 1941, and the final confirmation of my appointment as Chief was in June of 1942.

{23}

COL. AMEN : State briefly the functions of Amt VI of the RSHA.

{24}

SCHELLENBERG: Amt VI was the political secret service of the Reich and worked principally in foreign countries.

{25}

COL. AMEN : Do you know of an agreement between OKW, OKH, and the RSHA concerning the use of Einsatz groups and Einsatzkommandos in the Russian campaign?

{26}

SCHELLENBERG: At the end of May 1941 conferences took place between the then head of the Security Police and the Quartermaster General, General Wagner.

{27}

COL. AMEN : And who?

{28}

SCHELLENBERG: The Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner.

{29}

COL. AMEN : Did you personally attend those conferences?

{30}

SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes of the final conferences.

{31}

COL. AMEN : Have you given us the names of all persons present during those negotiations?

{32}

SCHELLENBERG: The negotiations took place principally between Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich, who was then the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, and the Quartermaster General of the Army.

{33}

COL. AMEN : Was anyone else present during any of the negotiations?

{34}

SCHELLENBERG: Not during the negotiations themselves, but at a later meeting other persons took part.

{35}

COL. AMEN : And did those negotiations result in the signing of an agreement?

{36}

SCHELLENBERG: A written agreement was concluded.

{37}

COL. AMEN : Were you there when the written agreement was signed?

{38}

SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes and I saw both gentlemen sign.

{39}

COL. AMEN : By whom was this agreement signed?

{40}

SCHELLENBERG: It was signed by the then Chief of the Security Police, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich, and the Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner.

{41}

COL. AMEN : Do you know where the original agreement, or any copy thereof, is located today?

{42}

SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot say. I know nothing about that.

375
{43}

COL. AMEN : But you are familiar with the contents of that written agreement?

{44}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; for the most part I recall that.

{45}

COL. AMEN : To the best of your knowledge and recollection, please tell the Tribunal exactly what was contained in that written agreement.

{46}

SCHELLENBERG: The first part of this agreement began with the quotation of a basic decree by the Fuehrer. It read in the introductory clause somewhat as follows:

For the safety of the fighting troops in the Russian campaign that is now expected to start, all means are to be used to keep the rear safe and protected. On the basis of this consideration every means is to be used to break any resistance. In order to support the fighting units of the Army, the Security Police and the Security Service are also to be called in for this task.

If I remember correctly, as a special example of something to be protected, the safeguarding of the so-called great routes of supply, also caned "Rollbahnen," was mentioned.

{47}

COL. AMEN : Do you recall anything else contained in that agreement?

{48}

SCHELLENBERG: In the second part of this agreement the organization of the army groups was mentioned.

{49}

COL. AMEN : And what was said about that?

{50}

SCHELLENBERG: And the corresponding organization of the Einsatz groups and the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD. Four different sectors were mentioned.>

I remember the following: First, the front area; second, the operational zone-it was also -divided into an army group area and a rear army group area; third, the rear army area; and fourth, the area where the civil administration (Reichskommissariat) was to be set up.

In these different areas, the division of subordination and command was clearly defined. In the front areas or fighting areas, the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD were tactically and operationally under the command of the Army; that is, they were completely under the command of the Army.

In the operational zones only operational subordination should apply and this same rule should apply in the rear army area. In the zone intended for the civil administration (Reichskommissariat) the same conditions of subordination and command were to apply as in Reich territory.

In a third part it was explained what was meant by tactical-and operational, or rather only the concept "operational" was explained 376in detail By "operational" was meant the subordination to the branches of the Army in respect to discipline and supplies. Special mention was made of the fact that the operational subordination also included all supplies especially supplies of gasoline, food, and the making available of technical routes for the transmission of intelligence.

{51}

COL. AMEN : Have you now told us everything which you recall about that agreement?

{52}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; I cannot remember anything else contained in the agreement.

{53}

COL. AMEN : If Your Honor pleases, that is all.

{54}

THE PRESIDENT: Does the English Prosecution have any questions to ask?

{55}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): No.

{56}

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecution have any questions to ask?

{57}

THE COL.POKROVSKY : No.

{58}

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecution have any questions to ask?

[There was no response.]
{59}

THE PRESIDENT: Do the defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?

{60}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Is it correct that Dr. Kaltenbrunner was your superior?

{61}

SCHELLENBERG: Dr. Kaltenbrunner was my immediate superior.

{62}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Until what time?

{63}

SCHELLENBERG: From the 30th of January of 1943 until the end.

{64}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Do you know his attitude towards the main themes of National Socialism, for instance, the treatment of the Jews or the treatment of the Church?

{65}

SCHELLENBERG: I personally did not have a chance to converse with him on these problems. What I know about him is the result of my own few personal observations.

{66}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Did you see original orders from Kaltenbrunner dealing with the execution of saboteurs, the confinement of people in concentration camps, and the like?

{67}

SCHELLENBERG: No. I heard him give only oral orders in respect to this-commands which he gave to the Chief of the State Police, the Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA.

{68}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Did Kaltenbrunner ever indicate to you that he had agreed with Himmler that everything concerning concentration camps and the entire executive power was to be taken away from him and that only the SD, as an intelligence service, was to be entrusted to him and that he wanted to expand this intelligence service in order to supply the criticism that was otherwise lacking?

{69}

SCHELLENBERG: I never heard of any such agreement, and what I found out later to be the facts is to the contrary.

{70}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Now, since you have given a negative answer, I must ask you the following question, in order to make this one point clear: Which facts do you mean?

{71}

SCHELLENBERG: I mean, for instance, the fact that after the Reichsfuehrer SS very reluctantly agreed, through my persuasion, not to evacuate the concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner-by getting into direct contact with Hitler-circumvented this order of Himmler's and broke his word in respect to international promises.

{72}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Were there any international decisions in respect to this-decisions which referred to existing laws or decisions which referred to international agreements?

{73}

SCHELLENBERG: I would like to explain that, if through the intermediary of internationally known persons, the then Reichsfuehrer SS promised the official Allied authorities not to evacuate the concentration camps, owing to the general distress, this promise was binding according to human rights.

{74}

DR. KAUFFMANN : What do you mean by evacuate?

{75}

SCHELLENBERG: Arbitrarily to evacuate the camps before the approaching enemy troops and to scatter them to other parts of Germany still unoccupied by the enemy troops.

{76}

DR. KAUFFMANN : What was your opinion?

{77}

SCHELLENBERG: That no further evacuation should take place, because human rights simply did not allow it.

{78}

DR. KAUFFMANN : That the camps should therefore be surrendered to the approaching enemy?

{79}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

{80}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Did you know that your activity, too, could bring suffering to many people, to people who were per se innocent?

{81}

SCHELLENBERG: I did not understand the question. Will you please repeat it?

{82}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Did you ever think that your motive, too, and the activity of your fellow-workers was a cause for the great suffering of many people-let us say Jews-even though these people were innocent?

378
{83}

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot imagine that the activity of my office could cause any such thing. I was merely in an information service.

{84}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Then your information service had no connection at all with such crimes.

{85}

SCHELLENBERG: No.

{86}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Then Kaltenbrunner, too, would not be guilty in regard to this point?

{87}

SCHELLENBERG: Certainly; because he was, at the same time, the Chief of Amt IV of the State Police.

{88}

DR. KAUFFMANN : I asked "in regard to this point," and by that I meant your sector.

{89}

SCHELLENBERG: I only represented the Sector Amt VI and Amt Military.

{90}

DR. KAUFFMANN : But Kaltenbrunner, at the same time, was Chief of Amt VI?

{91}

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA. Eight departments, as you probably know, were under him. I was at the head of one or two of them, namely, Amt VI and Amt Military. These two offices had nothing to do with the executive power of the State Police.

{92}

DR. KAUFFMANN : Then, if your department. ..

{93}

THE PRESIDENT: What I understood you to say was that you were only in a branch which was an information center; is that right?

{94}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

{95}

THE PRESIDENT: And that Kaltenbrunner was your immediate chief; is that right?

{96}

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA.

{97}

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he was the Chief not only of your branch but of the whole organization.

{98}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

{99}

DR. KAUFFMANN : I should like to question this witness later on, after I have talked with Kaltenbrunner.

{100}

DR. KUBUSCHOK : In the summer of 1943 were you in Ankara? And did you, on this occasion pay a visit to the German Embassy?

{101}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

{102}

DR. KUBUSCHOK : Did you during this visit criticize German foreign policy in various respects, and did you mention that it was absolutely advisable to establish better relations with the Holy See Did Herr Von Papen then answer, "That would be possible only if in accordance with the demands that I have made repeatedly, the Church policy is revised completely and the persecution of the Church ceases"?

{103}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, the gist of the conversation is correct; and I spoke with the then Ambassador Von Papen to this effect.

{104}

DR. THOMA : (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): You said a little while ago that, with respect to authority, the same regulations applied in the area of the civil administration as in the Reich.

{105}

SCHELLENBERG: I said they were to apply.

{106}

DR. THOMA : Please answer my question again.

{107}

SCHELLENBERG: I will repeat: I described the agreement which contained the provision that in the areas intended for civil administration (Reichskommissariat) the same relations between the Army and the Security Police and the SD, in regard to subordination and command, were applicable as in the Reich.

{108}

DR. THOMA : Do you know how that was done in practice?

{109}

SCHELLENBERG: No, later on I did not concern myself with these questions any more.

{110}

DR. THOMA : Thank you.

{111}

HERR BABEL: You were a member of the SS and of the SD, and in leading positions...

{112}

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state, for the purposes of the record, which organization you appear on behalf of?

{113}

HERR BABEL: I represent the organization of the SS and SD. (Turning to the witness.) In the RSHA there were departments of the Security Police and the SD. How were these two departments interrelated, and what was the purpose of the SD?

{114}

SCHELLENBERG: That is a question that I cannot answer with one sentence.

{115}

HERR BABEL: I can withdraw the question for the moment and ask a concrete one: Was the SD used with the "Einsatzgruppen" in the East? To what extent? And for what tasks?

{116}

SCHELLENBERG: I believe that most of this work in the East was undertaken by the Security Police, that is, by the Secret State Police and the Criminal Police and that only supplementary contingents were formed from the personnel of the SD.

{117}

HERR BABEL: How large were these contingents? How large was the SD?

{118}

SCHELLENBERG: I believe that I can estimate the figures: Excluding female employees, the State Police-perhaps 40,000 to 45,000; the Criminal Police-15,000 to 20,000; the SD of the interior, that is, Amt III with its organizational subsidiaries-2,000 to 2,500; and the SD outside Germany, that is my Amt VI-about 400.

380
{119}

HERR BABEL: And how was the SD used in the East with the Einsatz groups.

{120}

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot give you the particulars, as that was a concern of the personnel administration and it depended entirely upon the of the then Chief of the Security Police.

{121}

HERR BABEL: Did the figures you mentioned include only the male members of the SD, or were the female employees also included?

{122}

SCHELLENBERG: Only male members. I excluded the female employees.

{123}

HERR BABEL: Yesterday a witness gave us approximately the same figure of 3,000, but he included the female employees in this figure.

{124}

SCHELLENBERG: I mentioned a figure of 2,000 to 2,500 for the SD in the interior.

{125}

HERR BABEL: What was the organizational structure of the Waffen-SS?

{126}

SCHELLENBERG: As for the organizational structure of the Waffen-SS, I cannot give you a detailed reply that is reliable as I did not deal with this question.

{127}

HERR BABEL: You were a member of the Waffen-SS and of the SD?

{128}

SCHELLENBERG: I was merely appointed a member of the Waffen-SS in January 1945, so to speak by higher orders, because I had many military units under my command and I had to be given a military rank through the Amt Military.

{129}

HERR BABEL: Do you know whether that also happened to a large extent in other cases?

{130}

SCHELLENBERG: That question is beyond me.

{131}

HERR BABEL: Thank you.

{132}

COL. AMEN : Do you know of any particular case in which Kaltenbrunner had ordered the evacuation of any one concentration camp, contrary to Himmler's wishes?

{133}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

{134}

COL. AMEN : Will you tell the Tribunal about that?

{135}

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was in the beginning of April 1945. The son of the former Swiss President, Muesi, who had taken his father to Switzerland, returned by car to the Buchenwald Concentration Camp, in order to fetch a Jewish family which I myself had set free. He found the camp in process of being evacuated under the most deplorable conditions. When he had, 3 days previously, driven his father to Switzerland, he was given definite assurance before he left that the camps would

381

not be evacuated. Since this assurance was also intended for General Eisenhower, he was doubly disappointed at this breach of promise. Muesi, Jr., called on me personally at my office. He was deeply offended and reproached me bitterly. I could not understand what had happened; and I at once contacted Himmler's secretary, protesting against this sort of procedure. Shortly after, it was admitted that the facts as depicted by Muesi, Jr., were true, although it was still incomprehensible, because Himmler had not given these orders. I was assured that everything would be done to put an immediate halt to the evacuations. This was confirmed on the telephone personally by Himmler a few hours later. I believe it was on the same day, after a meeting of office chiefs, that I informed Kaltenbrunner of the situation and expressed my profound concern at this new breach of international assurances. As I paused in the conversation, the Chief of the State Police, Gruppenfuehrer Muller, interrupted and explained that he had started the evacuation of the more important internees from the individual camps 3 days ago on Kaltenbrunner's orders. Kaltenbrunner replied with these words:

"Yes, that is correct. It was an order of the Fuehrer which was also recently confirmed by the Fuehrer in person. All the important internees are to be evacuated at his order to the south of the Reich."

He then turned to me mockingly and, speaking in dialect, said:

"Tell your old gentleman (i.e. Muesi, Sr.) that there are still enough left in the camps. With that you too can be satisfied." I think this was on 10 April 1945.

{136}

COL. AMEN : That is all, may it please the. Tribunal.

{137}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): Can you say now what the functions of the RSHA were?

{138}

SCHELLENBERG: That I cannot answer in one sentence. I believe . . .

{139}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): Be brief, be brief! What were the aims?

{140}

SCHELLENBERG: The RSHA was a comprehensive grouping of the Security Police, that is, the State Police...

{141}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): We know about this organization on the basis of the documents which are at the disposal of the Court, but what were its functions?

{142}

SCHELLENBERG: I just wanted to explain its functions. Its functions consisted of security, that is, State Police activity, of Criminal Police activity, and of intelligence activity at home and abroad.

382
{143}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): Would it be correct to formulate the functions as follows: To suppress those whom the Nazi Party considered its enemies?

{144}

SCHELLENBERG: No, I think this statement is too one-sided.

{145}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): But all these functions were included?

{146}

SCHELLENBERG: They were, perhaps, a certain part of the activities of the State Police.

{147}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): Had this part of the functions, then, been changed after Kaltenbrunner took office?

{148}

SCHELLENBERG: No, there was no change.

{149}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): Had those functions, to which you referred just now, been changed since the time that Kaltenbrunner took office as Chief of the Security Police?

{150}

SCHELLENBERG: The functions, as I formulated them, did not change after Kaltenbrunner assumed office.

{151}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen.Nikitchenko): I have one more question: What were the aims and purposes of the Einsatz groups which were to have been created on the basis of the agreement between the SD and the High Command?

{152}

SCHELLENBERG: As I mentioned before, in the first part of the agreement made at that time it was laid down that the rear must be protected and all means used to repress any resistance.

{153}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): To repress or to crush resistance?

{154}

SCHELLENBERG: The words were, "All resistance is to be crushed with every means." ~

{155}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): By what means was the resistance to be suppressed?

{156}

SCHELLENBERG: The agreement did not mention or discuss this in any way.

{157}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): But you know what means were used for that suppression, do you not?

{158}

SCHELLENBERG: Later I heard that because of the bitterness of the struggle, harsh means were chosen, but I know this only by hearsay.

{159}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): What does it mean more exactly?

{160}

SCHELLENBERG: That in partisan fighting and in encounters with the civilian population many shootings took place.

{161}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): Including children?

383
{162}

SCHELLENBERG: I didn't hear about that.

{163}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): You didn't hear about it?

[There was no response.] .
{164}

THE TRIBUNAL(Gen. Nikitchenko): That is all.

{165}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Since Your Lordship was good enough to ask me whether I wanted to put any questions, I have had some further information and I should be very grateful if the Tribunal would be good enough to allow me to ask one or two questions. (Turning to the witness.) Would you direct your mind to a conversation between the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, Gruppenfuehrer Nebe, and Gruppenfuehrer Muller, in the spring of 1944, in Berlin at Wilhelmstrasse 102.

{166}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

{167}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With what was that conversation concerned?

{168}

SCHELLENBERG: This conversation, as far as I could gather- for I took no part in it-concerned the subsequent covering for the shooting of about 50 English or American prisoners of war. The gist of the conversation was, as far as I remember, that there had evidently been an inquiry from the International Red Cross as to the whereabouts of 50 English and American prisoners of war. This request for information by the International Red Cross appears to have been passed on to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD by way of the Foreign Office. From the conversation I could. . .

{169}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was it already in the form of a protest against the shooting of prisoners of war?

{170}

SCHELLENBERG: I believe it was lodged in the form of a protest, since from fragments of this conversation I gathered that there was a discussion as to how the shooting of these prisoners of war, which had already taken place, could be covered up or disguised.

{171}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Kaltenbrunner discuss this with Muller and Nebe? ,

{172}

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner discussed this matter with Muller and Nebe, but I heard merely fragments of the conversation. I heard, incidentally, that they meant to discuss the details in the course of the afternoon.

{173}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear any suggestion put forward as to what explanations should be given to cover the shooting of these prisoners?

{174}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, Kaltenbrunner himself offered these suggestions.

{175}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What were the suggestions?

{176}

SCHELLENBERG: That the majority should be treated as individual cases, as "having perished in air raids"; some, I believe, because they "offered resistance," that is, "physical resistance," while others were "pursued when escaping."

{177}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean-shot while trying to escape?

{178}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, shot in flight.

{179}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And these were the excuses which Kaltenbrunner suggested?

{180}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, these were the excuses that Kaltenbrunner suggested.

{181}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to try and remember as well as you can about these prisoners. Does any number remain in your mind? Can you remember any number of prisoners that they were discussing or how these explanations arose? About how many?

{182}

SCHELLENBERG: I remember only that the number "50" was mentioned over and over again, but what the actual details there I cannot say because I just caught fragments of the conversation. I could not follow the whole conversation.

{183}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the number "50" remains in your mind?

{184}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, I heard "50."

{185}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember anything of the place or the camp in which these people had been, who there said to have been shot?

{186}

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot tell you under oath. There is a possibility that I might add something I heard afterwards. I believe it was Breslau, but I cannot say it exactly, as a fact.

{187}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And can you remember anything of what service the people belonged to? Were they Air Force or Army? Have you any recollection on that point?

{188}

SCHELLENBERG: I believe they were all officers.

{189}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were officers?

{190}

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

{191}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you cannot remember what service?

{192}

SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot tell you.

{193}

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful to the Tribunal for letting me ask these questions.

385

.

{194}

COL. AMEN : That is all for this witness.

{195}

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the witness can go then.

[The witness left the stand.]
{196}

COL. AMEN : I wish to call as the next witness, Alois Hollriegel

[The witness, Hollriegel, took the stand.]
— —
{197}

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

{198}

ALOIS HOLLRIEGEL(Witness): Alois Hollriegel.

{199}

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: "I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing."

[The witness repeated the oath.]
{200}

THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down if you want to.

{201}

COL. AMEN : What position did you hold at the end of the war?

{202}

HOLLRIEGEL: At the end of the war I was Unterscharfuehrer at Mauthausen.

{203}

COL. AMEN : Were you a member of the Totenkopf SS?

{204}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes; in the year 1939 I was drafted into the SS.

{205}

COL. AMEN : What were your duties at the Mauthausen Concentration Camp?

{206}

HOLLRIEGEL: I was until the winter of 1942 with a guard company, and I stood guard. From 1942 until the end of the war I was detailed to the inner service of the concentration camp.

{207}

COL. AMEN : And you therefore had occasion to witness the extermination of inmates of that camp by shooting, gassing, and so forth?

{208}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes, I saw that.

{209}

COL. AMEN : And did you make an affidavit in this case to the effect that you saw Kaltenbrunner at that camp?

{210}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{211}

COL. AMEN : And that he saw and was familiar with the operation of the gas chamber there?

{212}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{213}

COL. AMEN : Did you also have occasion to see any other important personages visiting that concentration camp?

{214}

HOLLRIEGEL: I remember Pohl, Glucks, Kaltenbrunner, Schirach, and the Gauleiter of Styria, Uiberreither.

{215}

COL. AMEN : And did you personally see Schirach at that concentration camp at Mauthausen?

{216}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{217}

COL. AMEN : Do you remember what he looks like so that you could identify him?

386
{218}

HOLLRIEGEL: I think that he has probably changed a little in recent times, but I would certainly remember him.

{219}

COL. AMEN : How long ago was it that you saw him there?

{220}

HOLLRIEGEL: That was in the fall of 1942. Since then I have not seen him.

{221}

COL. AMEN : Will you look around the courtroom and see whether you can see Schirach in the courtroom?

{222}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{223}

COL. AMEN : Which person is it?

{224}

HOLLRIEGEL: In the second row, the third person from the left.

{225}

COL. AMEN : The affidavit to which I referred was Exhibit Number USA-515.

{226}

THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?

{227}

COL. AMEN : 2753-PS. (Turning to the witness.) I now show you a copy of Document Number 2641-PS and ask you whether you can recognize the place where those individuals are standing?

{228}

HOLLRIEGEL: As far as can be seen from the picture, it is a quarry. Whether it is at Mauthausen or not one cannot determine exactly, because the view is too small.

{229}

COL. AMEN : Would you repeat that answer please?

{230}

HOLLRIEGEL: Certainly. As far as can be seen from this picture, it is not possible to say definitely if this is the WienerGraben quarry which adjoined Mauthausen. It might easily be another quarry. A larger range of vision is required. But I think that visits were often made there. I assume that this is the Wiener-Graben quarry.

{231}

COL. AMEN : Very good. Just lay the picture aside for the time being. Did you have occasion to observe the killing of inmates of the concentration camp by pushing them off a cliff?

{232}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{233}

COL. AMEN : Will you tell the Tribunal what you saw with respect to that practice?

{234}

HOLLRIEGEL: I remember, it was in 1941. At that time I was with a guard company on the tower which closed off the area of the Wiener-Graben quarry. I was able to observe in the morning about six to eight prisoners who came with two SS men. One was Hauptscharfuehrer Spatzenocker and the other, Unterscharfuehrer Edenhofer; they moved about and made strange gestures. . .

{235}

THE PRESIDENT: Wait, you are going too fast. You should go slower.

387
{236}

HOLLRIEGEL: I saw that they were approaching the precipice near the quarry. I saw from my watchtower that these two SS men were beating the prisoners and I realized immediately that they intended to force them to throw themselves over the precipice or else to push them over. I noticed how one of the prisoners was kicked while lying on the ground, and the gestures showed that he was supposed to throw himself down the precipice. This the prisoner promptly did under the pressure of the blows-presumably in despair.

{237}

COL. AMEN : How steep was the precipice?

{238}

HOLLRIEGEL: I estimate it to be 30 to 40 meters.

{239}

COL. AMEN : Was there a term used amongst you guards for this practice of having the prisoners fall from the top of the precipice?

{240}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Mauthausen Camp they were called paratroopers.

{241}

COL. AMEN : The witness is available to other counsel.

{242}

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecutor or the French Prosecutor or any defense counsel have any questions?

{243}

DR. SAUTER : Witness, I am interested in the following points: You said just now that in 1939 you were taken into the SS?

{244}

HOLLRIEGEL: That is true; on the 6th of September...

{245}

DR. SAUTER : One moment; please repeat your answer.

{246}

HOLLRIEGEL: That is right. On the 6th of September 1939 I was taken into the SS at Ebersberg near Linz.

{247}

DR. SAUTER : Had you no connection at all with the Party before then?

{248}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes. In April 1938 I enlisted in the civilian SS, because I was out of work during the entire previous period of the Schuschnigg Government and without any support, and consequently I thought, I would join the civilian SS; there I would get work in order to marry my wife.

{249}

DR. SAUTER : Then, if I understood you correctly, you were drafted into the SS in 1939, because you had already voluntarily enlisted in the civilian SS in the spring of 1938?

{250}

HOLLRIEGEL: I cannot say that exactly. Many were drafted into the Armed Forces, into the Air Force, and into the General SS.

{251}

DR. SAUTER : Are you an Austrian?

{252}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{253}

DR. SAUTER : Then at that time you lived in Austria?

{254}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Graz.

{255}

DR. SAUTER : Then I should be interested in a certain point in regard to the Defendant Von Schirach. You saw the Defendant Von Schirach at Mauthausen. How often did you see him there?

388
{256}

HOLLRIEGEL: I can remember quite clearly-once.

{257}

DR. SAUTER : Once?

{258}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{259}

DR. SAUTER : Was Von Schirach alone at Mauthausen, or was he together with other people?

{260}

HOLLRIEGEL: No. Von Schirach was accompanied by other gentlemen. There was a group of about 10 people, and among them I recognized Von Schirach and Gauleiter Uiberreither.

{261}

DR. SAUTER : There are supposed to have been 20 persons at least and not 10 on that occasion.

{262}

HOLLRIEGEL: I did not know at that time that I might have to use these figures; I did not count them.

{263}

DR. SAUTER : This point is important to me, because the Defendant Schirach told me it was a visiting inspection, an official inspection tour of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, as a result of a meeting of the economic advisors of all six Gaue of the Ostmark.

{264}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes, I naturally did not know why he came to the camp, but I remember that this group came with Von' Schirach and Schutzhaftlagerfuehrer (Protective Custody-Camp Leader) Bachmeyer. At any rate I could see that it looked like an inspection.

{265}

DR. SAUTER : Did you know that this inspection was announced in the camp several days before and that certain preparations were made in the camp because of this inspection?

{266}

HOLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember any specific preparations but I do remember it was in the evening. I can't tell you the exact time; it was the time of the evening roll call. The prisoners had assembled for roll call and all the hands on duty also had to fall in. Then this group came in.

DR.SAUTER: Did you or your comrades not know on the day before that this inspection would take place the very next day?

{267}

HOLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember that.

DR.SAUTER: And did it not strike you that certain definite preparations had been made in this camp?
{268}

HOLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember noticing that any preparations had been made.

{269}

DR. SAUTER : I have no further questions to ask this witness.

{270}

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Witness, you described an incident which, judged by the concepts of civilized people, cannot be termed anything but murder-that is, the hurling of people over the side of the quarry. Did you report this incident to your superiors?

{271}

HOLLBIEGEL: These incidents happened frequently and one can take it that the chances were a thousand to one that the superiors knew about them.

{272}

DR. STEINBAUER : In other words, you did not report this. Is it true that not only the internees but also the guards were forbidden under pain of death to report incidents of this sort to a third person?

{273}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{274}

DR. STEINBAUER : I have no other question.

{275}

COL. AMEN : Would you just look at that picture again?

{276}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{277}

COL. AMEN : Will you look at it carefully and tell me whether that is the quarry underneath the cliff which you have just described?

{278}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes. As far as I can tell from this picture, and I assume with a 100 percent degree of accuracy that it is the quarry Wiener-Graben; but one would have to see more, more background, to decide whether it is really this quarry. One sees too little, but I think quite certainly...

{279}

COL. AMEN : Do you recognize the individuals whose faces appear in the picture?

{280}

HOLLRIEGEL: Yes.

{281}

COL. AMEN : Will you tell the Tribunal the ones which you do recognize?

{282}

HOLLRIEGEL: I recognize of course Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler first of all, next to him the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp Ziereis and way to the right I recognize Kaltenbrunner.

{283}

COL. AMEN : That is all, may it please the Tribunal.

{284}

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can go and we will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]
{285}

COL. STOREY : If the Tribunal please, the next and final subject of the criminal organizations is the General Staff and High Command, to be presented by Colonel Taylor.

{286}

COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Your Lordship and members of the Tribunal, the Indictment seeks a declaration of criminality, under Articles 9 to 11 of the Charter, against six groups or organizations; and the last one listed in the Indictment is a group described as the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.

At first sight these six groups and organizations seem to differ rather widely one from another, both in their composition and in 390their functions. But all of them are related, and we believe that they are logically indicted together before the Tribunal because they are the primary agencies and the chief tools by means of which the Nazi conspirators sought to achieve their aims. All six of them were either established by, controlled by, or became allied with the Nazis; and they were essential to the success of the Nazis. They were at once the principal and indispensable instruments: The Party, the Government, the Police, and the Armed Forces. It is my task to present the case in chief against the General Staff and High Command group.

Now, in one respect this group is to be sharply distinguished from the other groups and organizations against which we have sought this declaration. For example, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party-of the NSDAP-is the Leadership Corps of the Party itself, the Party which was the embodiment of Nazism and which was the instrument primarily through which Hitlerism rode to full power and tyranny in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches-to be sure, large branches-of the Nazi Party. The German Police did, indeed, have certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism; but it became 99 per cent a creature of the Nazi Party and the SS. The Reich Cabinet was in essence merely a committee or series of committees of Reich Ministers; and when the Nazis came to power, quite naturally these ministerial positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All these groups and organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to Nazism or automatically became Nazified when Hitler came to power.

Now, that is not true of the group with which we are now concerned. I need not remind the Tribunal that German armed might and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades. One need not be a graybeard to have very vivid personal recollections of the war of 1914 to 1918, of the Kaiser, and of the "scrap of paper." For these reasons I want to sketch very briefly, before going into the evidence, the nature of our case against this group, which is unique in the particulars I have mentioned.

As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles, the size and permissible scope of activities of the German Armed Forces were severely restricted. That these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism, the last few years have made abundantly apparent. The full flowering of German military strength came about through collaboration; collaboration between the Nazis on the one hand and the career leaders of the German Armed Forces-the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

When Hitler came to power, he did not find a vacuum in the field of military affairs. He found a small Reichswehr and a body 391of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history. The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in the Indictment, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men.

Now, needless to say, it is not the Prosecution's position that it is a crime to be a soldier or a sailor or to serve one's country as a soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one and can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform.

It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the Prosecution's position that every member of this group was a wicked man or that they were all equally culpable. But we will show that this group not only collaborated with Hitler and supported the essential Nazi objectives, but we win show that they furnished the one thing which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany; and that was skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.

Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? I think Your Honors will see, as the proof is given, that the answer is very simple. The answer is that they agreed with the truly basic objectives of Hitlerism and Nazism and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in achieving these objectives The generals, like Hitler, wanted to aggrandize Germany at the expense of neighboring countries and were prepared to do so by force or threat of force. Force, armed might, was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have been possible.

As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had two alternatives: either to collaborate with and expand the small German Army, known as the Reichswehr, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter and accordingly were the more inclined to collaborate. Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of achieving much that they wished to achieve by way of expanding German armies and German frontiers; and so, as we will show, the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, as the proof will show, ultimately it was the generals who were taken for a ride by the Nazis.

Hitler, in short, attracted the generals to him with the glitter of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically; and, as the war proceeded, they became his tools. But if these military leaders became the tools of Nazism, it is not to be supposed that 392they were unwitting or that they did not participate fully in many of the crimes which we will bring to the notice of the Tribunal The willingness-and, indeed, the eagerness-of the German professional officer corps to become partners of the Nazis, will be fully developed.

Your Lordship, there will be three principal parts to this presentation. There will be first a description of the composition and functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment; next, the evidence in support of the charges of criminality under Counts One and Two of the Indictment; finally, the evidence in support of the charges under Counts Three and Four.

The members of the Tribunal should have before them three document books which have been given the designation "CC." The first of these books is a series of sworn statements or affidavits which are available to the Tribunal in English, Russian, and French and which have been available to the defendants in German. The second and third books are the usual type of document books, separated merely for convenience of handling. The second book contains documents in the C- and L-series, and the third book, in the PS- and IT-series. For the convenience of the Tribunal we have had handed up a list of these documents in the order in which they will be referred to.

The Tribunal should also have one other document, and that is a short mimeographed statement entitled, "Basic Information on the Organization of the German Armed Forces." That has also been handed up in English, Russian, and French and has been made available to the defendants' Information Center in German.

So I turn first to the description of the group as defined in the Indictment.

During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name, the German General Staff or Great General Staff, persists in the public mind; but the Grosse Generalstab no longer exists in fact. There has been no such single organization, no single German General Staff, since 1918; but there has, of course, been a group of men responsible for the policy and the acts of the German Armed Forces, and the fact that these men have no single collective name does not prevent us from collecting them together. They cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies, not in the name you give it, but in the functions it performs; and the men comprised within the group as we have defined it in the Indictment do constitute a functional group, welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the principal authority and responsibility under Hitler for the plans and operations of the German Armed Forces. 393

Let us examine first the general structure and organization of the German Armed Forces and then look at the composition of the group as specified in the Indictment. As I just mentioned, we have prepared a very short written exposition of the organization of the German Armed Forces, which we have handed up to the Tribunal. That document contains a short sketch setting forth the basic history and development of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces since 1933 and the structure as it emerged after its reorganization in 1938. It also contains a simple chart which, in a few moments, will be displayed at the front of the courtroom. It also contains a short glossary of German military expressions; and it contains a comparative table of ranks in the German Army and in the SS, showing the equivalent ranks in the American Army and the equivalent ranks for the German Navy and the British Navy. I may say that military and naval ranks differ slightly among the principal nations, but that by and large they follow the same general pattern and terminology.

When the Nazis came to power in 1933, the German Armed Forces were controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, who at that time was Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg. Under Von Blomberg were the Chief of the Army Staff, who at that time was Von Fritsch, and of the Naval Staff, the Defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatever. The Army and Naval Staffs were renamed "High Command" -Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine-from which are derived the initials by which they are generally known, OKH and OKM.

In May 1935 at the time that military conscription was introduced in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices; but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshal Von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the Armed Forces, with the title of Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch assumed the title Commander-in-Chief of the army, end Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this same time, but it was not put under Von Blomberg. It was an independent institution under the personal command of the Defendant Goering who had the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

I will now ask that that chart be displayed, please.

This chart, Your Honors, has been certified and sworn to by three principal German generals and the affidavits with reference to it cull be introduced in a few moments. It shows the organization, 394the top organization, of the Armed Forces as it emerged in 1938 after the reorganization which I will now describe.

In February 1938 Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch were both retired from their positions and Blomberg's ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up. The War Ministry had contained a division or department called the Wehrmachtsamt, meaning the Armed Forces Department; and the function of that department had been to co-ordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces authority known as the High Command of the German Armed Forces-that is the box in the center, right under Hitler-known in German as Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, and usually known by the initials OKW.

Since the Air Force as well as the Army was subordinated to OKW, co-ordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was really Hitler's personal staff for these matters. The Defendant Keitel was appointed Chief of the OKW. The most important division of the OKW, shown just to the right, was the Operations Staff, of which the Defendant Jodl became the chief.

Now, this reorganization and the establishment of OKW was embodied in a decree issued by Hitler on the 4th of February 1938. This decree appeared in the Reichsgesetzblatt, and I invite the Court's attention to it by way of judicial notice (1915-PS). Copies are available; and I would like to read the decree, which is very short, into the transcript. I quote:

"Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on exercised directly by me personally."

{287}

THE PRESIDENT: Where do we find it?

"Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the head of State who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.

"Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of State), that is to say, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In practice supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision on the basis of their official instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations 400of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW and were presented to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of State).

"The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as might possibly be undertaken by troops in the field.

"Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled occasionally and given appropriate directions by the head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.

"The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces."-Signed- "don Brauchitsch."

Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart which is on display at the front of the Court and which is contained in the short expository statement has been laid before Von Brauchitsch and Halder and that these two officers have vouched for it under oath as an accurate picture of the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by Von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the Prosecution's statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters.

I would now like to offer another affidavit by Halder which sets forth some of the matters of detail to which I adverted in describing the group. It is quite short. Affidavit Number 6, which becomes Exhibit USA-533 (Document 3704-PS)-and I shall read it in full into the transcript:

"The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl but, in the planning and conduct of military affairs, they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl's staff. 401

"The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the National Defense Section, and it was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

"There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

"Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high ranking officers described in my statement of 7 November (in the Army, the General Staff of the Army; and in the Air Force, the General Staff of the Air Force).

"Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I, not worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval Staff. Signed: Halder."

The Tribunal will note that this affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of OKW, OKL, OKH, and OKM and fully supports the inclusion in the group of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW staff because of his strategic planning responsibilities.

I have just one other very short affidavit covering a matter of detail. The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting formation in the German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luftflotte and that all commanders-in-chief of air fleets are included in this group. That is the box in the lower right-hand corner. The commanders of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, but they were not formally so designated until 1944. These facts are set forth in an affidavit by the son of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. His son had the rank of Oberst, or colonel, in the German Air Force and was personal aide to the Defendant Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9 and becomes Exhibit Number USA-534 (Document 3705-PS). It reads as follows:

"Lutflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehlshaber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and, accordingly, exercised no territorial jurisdiction.

"They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force units subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. 402

"Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation Befehlshaber and from then on that of Oberbefehlshaber. This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities that they previously had."

Your Honor, that concludes the description of the composition of the group and the personnel of it. The staff of the Tribunal have referred to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tribunal by counsel for the group and it seemed to me it might be appropriate if I disposed of those inquiries now as to the composition of the group. The letters were turned over to me 2 days ago.

The first is from Hofrat Dullmann, and he has asked whether the group, as defined in the Indictment, is contingent upon rank, whether it includes officers holding a definite rank such as field marshal or "Generaloberst."

The answer to that is clearly "no." As has been pointed out, the criterion of membership in the group is whether one held one of the positions on the chart up there; and one would be in the group if one held one of the positions, no matter what one's rank. Rank is no criterion. In point of fact, I suppose everybody in the group held at least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the equivalent of lieutenant general in ours.

He has also asked whether the group includes officers of the so-called General Staff Corps. The answer to that is "no." There was in the German Army a war academy, and graduates of the war academy were in the branch of service described as the General Staff Corps. They signed themselves, for example, "Colonel in Generalstab." They functioned largely as adjutants and assistants to the chief staff officers. I suppose there were some thousands of them-two or three thousand, but they are not included in the group. Many of them were officers of junior rank. They are not named in the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect in which they are comprehended within the group as defined.

The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that he is in doubt as to the meaning of Oberbefehlshaber and goes on to state that he believes that Oberbefehlshaber includes commanders-in-chief in theaters of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups, and the commanders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those are the positions as shown on the chart.

Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group worked. In many respects, of course, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtained in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, 403needless to say, at the highest level; and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions, as well as purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision was made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the army groups and armies who would be in charge of the actual campaign; and then there would follow consultation between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, in order to revise and perfect and refine the plans.

The manner in which this group worked, involving as it did the interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, on the one hand, and the principal field commanders on the other hand, is graphically described in two statements by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. That is Affidavit Number 4, which will be Exhibit Number USA-535 (Document 3706-PS). I invite the Tribunal's attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement of 7 November 1945:

"In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him, as amended by a change which he desired. After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the army groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details, in order to hear their desires and recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their headquarters, as well as by telephone, teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them.

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff communicated with army groups and through them, as well as directly, with the armies; through army groups on strategic and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and administration of conquered territory occupied by the armies. An army group had no territorial executive power. It had a relatively small staff, which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the 404

Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and not of the army group, who exercised executive power. Signed: Von Brauchitsch."

There follows:

"Supplement to the statement of 7 November 1945:

"When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his political objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command. Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved.

"Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and armies and with the chiefs of staff of these commanders During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them.

"In the war against Russia the commanders of army groups and armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for report. Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups, and for all matters concerning supply and territorial executive power from the OKH directly to the armies. Signed: Von Brauchitsch."

The Oberbefehlshaber in the field, therefore-and in the case of the Army that means the commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies-participated in planning and directing the execution of the plans, as those affidavits show. The Oberbefehlshaber were also the repositories of general executive powers in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. In this connection I invite the Court's attention to Document 447-PS, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-135, this being a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. This directive sets out various regulations for the operations against the Soviet Union which were actually begun a few months later on 22 June. The documents, Your Honor, are in numerical order in Document 405

Books II and III. Document Book II contains C and L; Document Book III contains PS; and this, being 447-PS, will be in Document Book III in numerical order within the PS's. And within that Document, under Paragraph I, the paragraph entitled "Area of Operations and Executive Power" ("Vollziehende Gewalt"), the Tribunal will find Subparagraph 1, in which the following appears-that is Page 1 of the translation, Paragraph 2:

"It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the Government General an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief"- that, in the original German, is Oberbefehlshaber-"of the army groups and armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all other obligations and over orders issued by civilian agencies."

Your Honors will see that this executive power, with priority over civilian agencies, was vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the Army with authority to transfer it to commanders-in-chief of army groups or armies-to the members of the group as defined in the Indictment.

Further on in the document, under Subparagraph 2(a), the document states-that is the fourth paragraph, on Page 1 of the document:

"The area of operations of the Army created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power"-vollziehende Gewalt-"in this area, and may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief"-Oberbefehlshaber-"of the army groups and armies."

{288}

THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]
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